Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was one of the most, if not the most, important figures when regarding the rise of the Berlin Wall, as he single handedly increased tensions between the two sides, extending communism in Europe and threatening the West with an ultimatum to get out of Berlin within a 6 month timeframe.
Khrushchev
Nikita Khrushchev, no less than his predecessor Josef Stalin, believed in the final victory of communism, turning every possible opportunity into a publicity stunt to promote it and his idea of ‘peaceful coexistence’. This concept, although being his only clear option in the reality of the Cold War, was a contributor to increasing tensions. After being named Premier, Khrushchev devised the Warsaw Pact, which was a military treaty that attempted to match the strength of NATO. According to James Schlesinger, “The Soviet’s Warsaw Pact alongside NATO represented an obvious military division in Central Europe” (James R. Schlesinger, 1973). He was hoping to reinvigorate the Soviet Communist Party and that through the concept of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Bloc would soon be able to compete with the West.
The Situation
Due to the lack of opportunities in East Berlin, many citizens were emigrating to West Berlin in search of an improved life. The steady outflow to the West included professionals and students whose skills were vital regarding international development. This was a looming concern of Khrushchev’s, so in 1958, the same year he came to power, he gave the West an ultimatum to withdraw from Berlin within six months, making it a free demilitarised city. He was also concerned about the remilitarisation of West Germany and that its continuos economic expansion would eventually see the collapse of the German Democratic Republic. Khrushchev himself was reported to have said about the Berlin situation that “It’s the testicles of the West. Each time I give them a yank, they holler!” (Evans, 1988) U.S President at the time, Dwight D. Eisenhower, believed that U.S presence was necessary in protecting the freedom of West Berlin. The United States, Great Britain, and France responded to the ultimatum by firmly making known their determination to remain in the disputed city. Without the Western influence, the city would crumble, as Frederick Kempe stresses about the Soviet situation in Berlin that “They (East Germans) were preoccupied with the issues of the recognition of their state, its economic problems, and their desire to push ahead wth its Sovietisation” (Frederick Kempe, 2011, pg 61). This created further disagreement and more difference in opinions. Khrushchev also threatened to turn over to East Germany complete control over lines of communication in West Berlin, which would result in the Western Powers having access to West Berlin only by permission of the East government. Stubbornness from the Allied Powers in Germany resulted in the withdrawal of this deadline set by Khrushchev in 1959. Nevertheless, the tensions were still high in Berlin.
Berlin Crisis
Skipping forward 2 and a half years to January 1961, Khrushchev further stressed that the Western Powers must finish their “occupational regime” (State Dept, 1970, pg.1) in West Berlin and withdraw from the city. East German President Walter Ulbricht, working with Khrushchev, attempted to persuade the Soviets that an immediate solution was necessary and that force was the only way to stop the exodus. Professor Hope M. Harrison emphasises how Ulbricht was in great need of this: “Ulbricht, frustrated with Khrushchev’s slow approach on a permanent solution regarding… Berlin… decided to press the issue by requiring Western diplomats obtain GDR Foreign Ministry permission to enter East Berlin” (H.M Harrison, 2002, pg 105). This introduced a fragile problem for the Soviets, as the four-power status of Berlin stated travel between occupation zones was allowed and that the presence of German troops was forbidden in Berlin. This crisis, widely referred to as the “Berlin Crisis”, was the delicate and threatening environment newly elected U.S President John F. Kennedy was presented with. At the Vienna Conference in 1961, Khrushchev demanded a peace treaty aimed at the reunification of Germany under communist terms, thinking that this would cut off free world access to West Berlin. However, he created a new crisis over Berlin, threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany instead of the earlier proposed one. If this was to go through, existing four-power agreements guaranteeing access rights to Berlin would be ceased. The tensions were rising at a daunting rate.
Tensions Cave
Pressure continued to be applied by the Soviets for resolution in Berlin, as the possibility of war was now on the cards. In his speeches of August 7 and 11 in 1961, Khrushchev, although being against the possibility of it, brought this topic up, stating that it could happen if the Soviets were pushed by the West. In his speeches, he made it clear that “…if the Western Powers persisted in their refusal to sign a German peace treaty, this problem would have to be solved without them” (State Dept, 1970, pg. 73). In response to this crisis, Kennedy requested an increase in army stocks and the strength of the Navy and Air Force. In case of attack, he also requested for investment in fallout shelters and an increase in food, water, and first aid supply. Stirred by the crisis overall and Khrushchev’s speeches, more East Germans fled in high numbers to West Berlin.
The tensions were as high as they’d ever been, and the Berlin Wall began construction under Khrushchev’s orders in the early morning hours of August 13, 1961. Ulbricht had earlier suggested to Khrushchev that a wall be used to divide Berlin in the event that the Soviets did not go to war with the Allies. Khrushchev’s threatening and unpredictable attitude toward the situation and his peers was definitely a major factor in the rise of the Berlin Wall, as Historian Daniel A. Lazar suggests that “Khrushchev and Kennedy… engaged in heated and counter-productive diplomacy that ultimately made a solid divvies in Berlin necessary” (Daniel Aaron Lazar, 2008, pg 18). Although making life harder for some Berliners, the wall was a healthier alternative to a war, as John F. Kennedy once said, “A wall… is a hell of a lot better than a war!” (John F Kennedy, 1961). Historian Daniel A. Lazar infers about this prospect that “many scholars conclude that however inhumane, the Wall was necessary to thwart the threat of a third world war” (Daniel Aaron Lazar, 2008, pg 34).
The tensions were as high as they’d ever been, and the Berlin Wall began construction under Khrushchev’s orders in the early morning hours of August 13, 1961. Ulbricht had earlier suggested to Khrushchev that a wall be used to divide Berlin in the event that the Soviets did not go to war with the Allies. Khrushchev’s threatening and unpredictable attitude toward the situation and his peers was definitely a major factor in the rise of the Berlin Wall, as Historian Daniel A. Lazar suggests that “Khrushchev and Kennedy… engaged in heated and counter-productive diplomacy that ultimately made a solid divvies in Berlin necessary” (Daniel Aaron Lazar, 2008, pg 18). Although making life harder for some Berliners, the wall was a healthier alternative to a war, as John F. Kennedy once said, “A wall… is a hell of a lot better than a war!” (John F Kennedy, 1961). Historian Daniel A. Lazar infers about this prospect that “many scholars conclude that however inhumane, the Wall was necessary to thwart the threat of a third world war” (Daniel Aaron Lazar, 2008, pg 34).